Terrorism and the Economy

The far-reaching effects of terror attacks have substantial impacts on the way people choose to live their lives. Terrorism induces fear. This natural human reaction causes subjective beliefs and reality to diverge. Exploring the consequences of terrorism is a challenge for economists, especially with regard to the effects on rationality, consumption and economic behavior.

The recent terrorist attacks in Paris illustrates the global reach of the war on terror and the lasting ramifications that such acts of violence have on human behavior. Fear perpetuated by terrorism has a huge impact on subjective beliefs and individual choices. Although the likelihood of being harmed by terrorism is insignificant, the anxiousness created by terrorism has enduring effects that extend beyond the direct loss of human life. The thought of violence or being harmed in a terrorist attack alone has countless repercussions, such as increasing security at events to abstaining from air travel all together.

Fear can be defined as the degree to which subjective beliefs about danger deviate from objective assessments of the actual risk. This fear inhibits people from objectively controlling their emotions and recognizing the narrow likelihood of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack.  So, instead of continuing to make the economic decisions they would have made regardless of the attack, they make irrational ones, in response to the terror. The economic cost/benefit principle can, to some degree, explain this behavior.  Terrorism generates fear, which in turn amplifies subjective beliefs on the marginal impact of consuming a good, like a bus ride, on the probability of survival. People respond to fear by reducing the consumption of the terror affected good, or by taking costly actions to control fear by actively changing their perception of the risk of consuming such a good. Those who can overcome fear can then take advantage of the market, when the prices of these publics goods are low. Frequent users of bus or plane rides have more of an economic incentive to invest in terror-affected goods, while occasional users have weaker economic incentives in overcoming fear and may, instead of a plane, choose another, possibly more expensive alternative. This highlights the idea that economic incentives undermine emotional impulses when individuals make choices.

The fear of terror and economic incentives play a major role in dictating individual decision making.  It is quite interesting, however, to see the different levels of reaction people have to terror. While everyone has innate emotional responses to terrorism, they also have the capacity to control their emotions and limit overreactions, especially if they have prevailing economic incentives.  If these incentives are powerful enough, the innate emotional response to terrorism is overcome, and the impact that terrorism has on an individual’s economic decisions is much less.

'Risk'y Buisness

All of the students in our class recently participated in a modified game of risk in which each team was given a specific goal to try and accomplish, rather than just conquest for world domination. The game of risk allowed us to understand one of the most difficult aspects of international relations and foreign policy that there is. No state knows what another state wants. Even if two states are allies with each other the true goals of each state is still widely unknown to one another.

We found out at the end of class that two teams, I believe it was the Blue team and the Red team, had nearly identical goals in regards to capturing the Ukraine or territory around the Ukraine. This obviously immediately brought forth conflict between the two teams and subsequently affected the rest of the players. As a member of the Black team, whose goal was to establish 15 alliances on the board, the tension between the two teams fighting each other was a major impediment on our goal. If the Blue team had an alliance with the Yellow team it became difficult to to convince the Yellow team to form an alliance with the Red team and so on. Another dilemma was that if you pushed too hard when negotiating with other teams they would start to become suspicious of what your intent was and begin to react more resilient to your offers or suggestions. The biggest threat to each team, however, was the fact  that each team was given a 'secret power' that could prove to be disastrous when used. Even for the team using their 'secret power' the full consequences were unknown. For example, when the Black team decided to censure the Yellow for a turn it forced them to initiate their 'secret power' and schism. This schism led to the eventual win of the Black team but nobody could have prepared for such a move.

This game of Risk really demonstrated the large variety of factors that a nations leader must take into consideration before making any 'risk'y moves in regards to international affairs. In many cases it is impossible to  truly understand the objective of a state and how they will react to any offensive move you make, whether it is geared towards them or another state entirely.

This mindset perfectly fits in to the argument of whether or not the United States should begin combating ISIS. Fighting a terrorist groups obviously looks good on paper and in the media but it is far from being as simple as just sending in a drone strike or marching into Iraq/Syria to stop them. There will be consequences. These may include upsetting an ally of Iraq or Syria who is displeased with the United States for engaging themselves in another countries affairs. And what's worse is that, just as Risk has shown us, many of the consequences are not foreseeable. This is the true risk of international relation.  

Strategy in Risk

Elaine Hang

Professor Shirk

International Relations

9 December 2015

Strategy in Risk

The results of our modified Risk game show that there is no single playing style that will lead to success, just as there is no single theory of governance that will lead a country to the top. Though all the teams focused on fortifying their armies at first, each teams adopted a mix of liberal and realist strategy once the attacks began.

The strategy all the teams began involved fortifying their respective territories. This defensive move allowed teams to be prepared for future attacks, however it also encouraged isolationism. Because the teams were hesitant to initiate the first attacks, they focused on their own country’s needs and interests, which at the time included keeping out of the affairs of the other teams. However, the isolationist stances the teams took had to stop. In order to fulfill their respective goals, they had to take action.

As a member of the Red Team, I can only speak for them: Red Team took up a primarily realist strategy. We decided to attack the Blue Team because Blue’s armies were in the way of our goal, which was to take Ukraine and the surrounding territories. Red started to attack Blue’s territories in Asia because it was a faster route. Those attacks made when Blue were unaware of and vulnerable to Red’s actions. The idea of attacking when the opponent is most vulnerable resembled realist belief that a state should do what it needs to survive against a threat, especially at opportune times. By positioning itself as the initiating aggressor, Red started the major war against Blue.

Red also made some liberal moves such as allying ourselves with the Yellow Team and the Black Team. Red did not attack the territories of our allies because we did not believe attacking them would be a good use of our resources or helpful to our mission. Even as our allies pulled away from us, we hoped to maintain a non-verbal agreement that we would not attack them as along as they did not help Blue and Green.

Red also tried to attack conservatively; that is, focused our armies on one main area. Taking over too many territories would have left us very spread out and vulnerable to attack because the territories would not be well fortified. We tried to only focus on area that were directly blocking us from Ukraine, while being somewhat conscious of our surroundings. That focus on one area also resemble the realist idea of being more powerful as a regional hegemony, rather than a global hegemony.

Of course, Red lost while the Black/Pink Team won because they focused on procuring allies, a rather liberal move. The other teams who were close to winning had a mix of offensive/defensive and realist/liberal strategy. Green was one round away from winning. It had maintained a relative supportive alliance and mixed its moves between being defensive and offensive. That mix made the team unpredictable to helped them almost win.

As seen with the Red Team’s loss, being very focused on one goal and only playing with a realistic strategy can lead to defeat. The element of unpredictability that comes with mixing playing styles has a higher chance of success in terms of achieving a goal because it throws opponents off. This modified Risk game illustrated the consequences of primarily following a single strategy and mixing different types of strategy.

The US and Defense against Terrorism

Tomas Iturregui

            Terrorism in the US has always been a major threat, Especially after the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11^th, 2001. With the rise of the terrorist organization ISIS, there has been even more widespread panic in the US. The attacks in Paris which killed over 100 people caused even more hatred towards ISIS and more International awareness about recent terrorism. To prevent more attacks on home soil, the best strategy the US can take is to concentrate efforts on defense against terrorism rather than focusing efforts on attacking and moving troops into areas where terrorists are thought to be.

            Over the past couple decades, multiple terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS have threatened and a few times attacked the US on home soil and and citizens abroad. The largest attack was on the World Trade Center in New York City which killed a few thousand people. After that the US focused more on ramping up airport security. Since then there has not been a major attack in the US partially due to security and defense efforts made by the TSA.

            The only thing the US can do to truly combat terrorism is to focus efforts on defense. Attacking terrorists will not accomplish much due to a few reasons. First, they will always keep reappearing. We killed Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden who were two of the most wanted terrorists of the modern era. Even then, Al Qaeda was not done much harm. They simply found a new leader and carried on. Al Qaeda operates in a few different States and many of their whereabouts are unknown to the US. To wipe them out completely would be a very difficult task.

            Second, threatening terrorist groups would not influence them. If anything it is them threatening us that would have more of an impact. Last year ISIS sent a video of them killing an American reporter. Most of them are willing to die for their cause, therefore threatening them or killing some of them would most likely not get them to surrender. Even if we do manage to get rid of a certain group or large portion of one, more of that group or another group or faction will always reappear. Most terrorist groups that are seen as a threat to the US are located in the Middle East which is a very unstable region in general. Many governments of states there are unable to deal with the terrorists, and a few of the governments even work with the terrorists or turn a blind eye to their activity since various of them are failed or weak states. Until those governments are able to deal with those terrorists, it is going to be tough for the US to intervene.

            Attacking terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda head on is and has proven to be a very difficult task. The best strategy the US can take is to ensure that its own citizens are safe by concentrating on defense efforts in the US.

Defining Terrorism

In our class discussion about terrorism, there were arguments revolving around how to actually define it and and what it means in a general sense and what it means in a more finite sense. In my mind there is only one way to define terrorism: the way the State Department/FBI/CIA/White House define it. While there are differences in their individual definitions, they are all saying the same things: Terrorism is carried out by a non-state actor, on a non-military population, in order to start political change.

While some may argue that this definition is only such because it shield the United States from committing terrorism, I disagree. There are several reasons terrorism should not include state-sponsored attacks. When a state attacks another state, whether they attack a military base or a civilian population, it is much different than terrorism. As we discussed in class, it is an act of war carried out by that state. If the United States government attacked Cairo, that would be an act of war; if the Westboro Baptists attacked Cairo, that would be terrorism. (Side note: hopefully neither of those things ever happen)

Secondly, if the Westboro Baptists attacked a naval ship in Dubai, it would be different than them attacking a mosque in Dearborn, Michigan. The first is an attack on an armed military ship, the second is an act carried out to frighten a group of people. Both can be done in order to advance a political agenda, but they are different things.

Third and finally, if the aim of the attack is not political change, it cannot be considered terrorism. If someone is crazy and attacks a mosque purely because they cannot control themselves, it is not terrorism. If someone is mad that their ex-wife got the children and the house in the divorce and therefore shoots up a courthouse, that is also not terrorism. If a group of people in the United States is unhappy that we accept Syrian refugees and tries to bomb Congress, that is terrorism.

Even though some might see this needing to be amended, as long as our government abides by this definition of terrorism, we much also do that. We can try to change the definition, but until then we must accept it and understand it is a good definition.

Transnational Activism and Social Media

Environmental transnational activist groups may be only spreading information to followers, and not the targeted audience of fossil fuel supporters. A recent study conducted by Public Understanding of Science found that during an international day of protest called the Global Frackdown, communication on twitter was split into segmented “hashtag publics”. This means that conversations on the fracking debate were sheltered from one another, with little room for debate. The same trend is pertaining now to the Climate Summit; while climate activist circles are actively engaged in the subject, oil and gas industries are straying away from mentioning the issue on social media (Science Codex). Nonetheless, debate is necessary to generate long-term solutions to this issue. Without engaging dialogue between fossil fuel industrialists and climate change activists, agreements cannot be formed on ways to significantly decrease CO2 emissions. Oil-gas industry stakeholders, civil society, and states have to work together in order to address the environmental problems that will affect the world’s future.

Keck and Sikkink discuss the interconnectivity of transnational activist networks. These bubbles of conversation pool together local social movements, foundations, media, international organizations, and parts of governments. To be effective, transnational activist networks rely on the Boomerang Model, wherein issues are presented to a broader international base that then pressures the government. In the case of environmental transnational activism, the Boomerang Model may be the only means to achieve domestic goals. Many developing countries have a desirable incentive to industrialize with fossil fuel technology. In these countries, governments may be unwilling to compromise, associating decreased CO2 emissions with increased costs. The Boomerang Model causes foreign governments to come to a consensus on how to best provide financial incentives for developing countries. This model can also be attributed to wealthy nations. In countries such as the United States, corporate lobbyists may halt environmental laws needed for improved atmospheric conditions. To circumvent Congress, novel international approaches need to be consulted. The meeting at the Climate Summit avoids the need for Congressional approval, since whatever results from it will not be a treaty. If transnational activists can raise enough support to gather powerful heads of state, there is greater probability that CO2 emissions will start decreasing. Nonetheless, topics need to be generated in order for environmental issues to be understood among those in power.

To promote dialogue, environmental transnational activist groups need to broaden their scope and change their rhetoric. Part of the current problem is that both parties create an argument over information politics. In the same way that competing companies display the benefits of their products in different terms, an exchange of selective statistics causes a greater divide between supporters and dissidents of climate change. This problem can be addressed by creating a forum where facts are presented on equal grounds, and where both environmental and fiscal concerns can be handled on a logical basis. Nonetheless, I do not think that the current forms of social media are adequate for this forum. As aforementioned, social media sites such as twitter have a tendency to dissolve conversation between opposing groups. In order to promote change, a new social media forum needs to be created, one that convenes opposing parties and generates solutions and the unforeseen drawbacks associated with them.

 Works Cited

"Climate Activists Dominate Social Media, but Are They Just Preaching to the Choir? | Science Codex." Climate Activists Dominate Social Media, but Are They Just Preaching to the Choir? | Science Codex. 6 Dec. 2015. Web. 7 Dec. 2015.